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According to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), world military expendi-
tures exceeded $800bn in 1984. Large amounts of
scarce human and material resources are absorbed by
the arms race, in a world beset by mass unemployment,
poverty and deprivation. On the basis of the Study on
the Relationship between Disarmament andDevelopment
[United Nations 1981] the UN General Assembly, in
1982 called on all member states to initiate studies
which would explore the possibilities for disarmament
and defence conversion and the subsequent transfer of
resources to development assistance. To date the only
country to have seriously addressed itself to these
recommendations is Sweden. The detailed report
prepared by a Swedish team of experts led by Inga
Thorsson entitled In Pursuit ofDisarmament [Govern-
ment of Sweden 1984], is the first serious national
programme for defence conversion to have been
produced.
The main concern of the report is to provide the
Swedish Government with policy guidelines for the
planned transfer of resources from military to civilian
use, Detailed calculations are made for a gradual
reduction of military expenditures which would
involve the closing of military bases, the relocation
and retraining of military personnel, the provision of
alternative occupations for communities dependent
on military bases and the conversion of the domestic
defence industry to more socially useful production.
Finally, the report suggests various measures which
the government could adopt to increase Sweden's
development assistance to the Third World.
In Pursuit of Disarmament cannot necessarily be taken
as a blueprint for conversion which can be replicated
by other countries. But it does provide valuable
insights into the complexities of developing a
nationally coordinated programme, offering some
useful guidelines for proponents of disarmament and
conversion. Some of these are outlined below.
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In order to anticipate the nature of the problems that a
conversion process has to address it is essential to
look, in as much detail as possible, at the
characteristics of the defence industry. The Swedish
defence-industrial base shares common characteristics
with other European defence sectors. These include
the concentration of defence production in advanced
technology, high value added sectors such as
aerospace and electronics, high R & D intensity, the
specialisation of production resources, a degree of
excess capacity, marked differences between military
and civil technologies within the same sectors, heavy
state financing of development costs, and the high
and, to a considerable extent, politically determined
profitability of defence manufacturing.
The emphasis on quality and performance in
specialised branches of the military sector has led to
the acquisition of skills and, more particularly, to the
adoption of attitudes towards design and production
that would be out of place in most commercial fields,
where high volume production and increased
efficiency compete with quality as goals. This applies
especially to the scientific and engineering labour that
constitutes a large percentage of the military-
industrial workforce. Thus the skills required of
management in military-industrial enterprises are
quite unique to this field. Likewise the techniques of
lobbying the defence ministry and service personnel to
secure defence orders differ fundamentally from
commercial marketing practices.
Another characteristic of the defence industry which
poses a problem to conversion, is that some of the
capital equipment used in branches of defence
production is highly specialised and lacks the
flexibility required for civilian output. The extremely
demanding military standards and specifications and
the desire to have capacity available for mobilisation,
contributes to the separation of the military from
civilian industry. One of the more conspicuous results
of this is that the defence industry tends to acquire a lot
of excess capacity.
There are many other features of the defence industry
that tend to make the companies or enterprises
involved reluctant to convert to civilian production.
For example, defence work is paid for on a continuous
basis, providing a very favourable cash flow situation,
particularly for financially weak companies. Similarly,
companies accustomed to performing low risk
military R & D tend to be understandably nervous at
the prospect of committing their own resources to the
development and production of commodities for the
uncertain and competitive civilian market.
In view of these problems Thorsson outlines some of
the essential conditions which must be guaranteed if
the objectives of disarmament and conversion are to
be met. Conversion is not simply a technical process.
In fact, Thorsson believes that all the technical and
social problems are soluble if the political environment
is conducive to a solution. The support of both the
government and of the defence workforce is essential.
The political viability of conversion is dependent on
the protection of jobs. Continued employment in the
context of the restructuring of an industry can only be
guaranteed if the government's industrial and
economic policies are committed to maintaining the
level of aggregate demand and employment in the
economy as a whole and also in companies formerly
dependent on defence orders.
In view of the dependence of the defence industrial
sector on government, it is important that the
conversion process be properly planned. Large-scale
conversion to civil production has occurred in only a
few instances in recent years and in all these cases
government assistance was crucial. Government
orchestration of conversion would include subsidies
for investment, the guarantee of markets for
alternative products, and a retraining programme for
workers and management alike.
One factor which seriously complicates the conversion
process is the lack of risk-capital. Companies
dependent on the production of defence equipment,
who lack a large expansive civil sector which could
provide the resources for new projects, are faced with
considerable difficulties in developing products for
civilian markets. The provision of state financing for
civil sector innovation is essential if conversion is to be
successful.
A more contentious point argued by Thorsson is the
importance of involving the interests and capabilities
of management in the conversion process. Manage-
ment embodies the structures which maintain current
attitudes in the defence industry. Moreover, conversion
often challenges management's prerogatives, parti-
cularly where workers are engaged in alternative
product planning. Ideally management structures
need to be dismantled and retrained. The same also
applies to design teams whose attitudes about what
constitutes technological advance have been structured
around complex and sophisticated military techno-
logies. A government committed to conversion has to
confront the management and design structure of the
major arms enterprises while gaining the support of
the workers in the process.
There are a wide range of products which could be
produced by a converted military industry, a
combination of capital goods for industry and
government, and of consumer goods. These might
include such items as machine tools, health
equipment, educational aids, transport and energy
technologies and construction. There is the possibility
of developing more socially and ecologically responsive
technologies, but these require an adequate demand
and proper market research. Market penetration is a
difficult and costly process and generally new markets
require considerable expertise to develop. The
problem of ensuring adequate demand could,
however, be alleviated if central and local government
demand formed most of the market. Moreover, if
trade was planned and import controls were imposed
for a certain period of time, a breathing space could be
provided for converted industries to establish new
products and markets.
It is a commonly held assumption that one category of
socially useful production that defence firms could
convert to is the production of alternative technology
for the Third World. Indeed, Thorsson lists a number
of potential technologies including mining equipment,
water power machinery, agricultural equipment and
medical apparatus. However, as she points out, there
are several implicit problems with these assumptions.
Firstly, although there may be a demand for these
technologies, the funds to purchase them are often
lacking. Even if they are provided as gifts, there may
not be the available skills or space parts to maintain
the equipment in working order. Secondly, and more
importantly, the transfer of such products from
industrialised to less industrialised countries per-
petuates a situation of technological dependence,
which may retard the internal development process
within Third World countries. A more appropriate
development approach would be to assist in the
development of local based industries and the training
of local labour to enable Third World countries to
break the chains of dependence. What needs to be
challenged is the assumption that industrialised
countries have the right to define what is appropriate
for the Third World. A more genuine link between
disarmament and development would be created if
representatives from Third World countries could be
engaged in the definition of their technology needs and
the conditions under which the transfer of such
81
technologies took place. This would create the basis
for a more equal and constructive North-South
dialogue.
Thorssen's major recommendation for linking
Sweden's disarmament to development is through the
transfer of resources from the military sector to an
international disarmament fund for development. The
idea of establishing such a fund was first mooted
within the UN in the 1950s and has subsequently been
resurrected by the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) as the political
expression of the relationship between disarmament
and development. The impact of such a fund would be
considerable if all the major industrialised countries
reduced their military expenditure and transferred a
percentage of the released resources to the fund. If
present world military expenditure was to be reduced
by a mere four or five per cent and the subsequent
resources transferred to development aid, this would
represent a doubling of present development assistance.
Such a transfer would have a substantial effect on the
development of Third World countries.
What can we learn from Thorssen's report about the
possibility for conversion in other European countries?
The characteristics that differentiate Sweden from
other European countries with substantial arms
industries may help to highlight the obstacles to
disarmament and conversion. Over the last ten years
Sweden has maintained an average military expendi-
ture of 3.3 per cent of GDP out of which 30 per cent
goes on equipment procured largely from the domestic
defence industry. Under Swedish law the export of
armaments is illegal. Moreover, the initiation of a
conversion plan is itself an expression of Sweden's
strong national commitment to détente and dis-
armament and the conviction that it is both politically
important and economically advantageous to reduce
industry's dependence on military orders.
In many other European countries however, the major
obstacle to disarmament and conversion is the
integration of national defence policies into the aims
and objectives of the NATO alliance. NATO's defence
policy is based on a massive deployment of nuclear
missiles. As (in effect) offensive first-strike weapons,
they act to destabilise the world balance of power,
while absorbing huge amounts of scarce resources.
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Britain, which has the highest rate of defence spending
in Europe, at 5.4 per cent of GDP in 1984 [SIPRI
1985], has more cause for concern over the economic
effects of high military expenditure than most other
countries. However, a precondition for disarmament
and conversion would be some form of disengagement
from NATO and the denuclearisation of its defence
policy. Such a move would most probably require the
conscious adoption of an alternative defence policy.
However, denuclearisation and withdrawal from
NATO would not in itself guarantee a process of
disarmament. That would depend on what type of
alternative defence policy was adopted and whether
the political will for disarmament and conversion
existed. To its advantage, Britain has a strong peace
movement which has placed the issue of disarmament
and conversion firmly on the political agenda.
In France, the picture is very different. France does
not, though belonging to the NATO alliance,
participate in its command structure. However, there
is a strong political consensus in support of high
military expenditure, which represented 4. 1 per cent of
GDP in 1984. National pride in France's independent
nuclear deterrent and military technological achieve-
ments ensure the continuing existence of a large
defence industry. France is now the third largest
exporter of arms in the world, a situation actively
supported by the government, which views the export
of weapons as a major contributor to the country's
balance of payments and an integral part of its trade
and foreign policies.
Thus, in sum, the preconditions for disarmament and
conversion in both France and Britain diverge widely
from those established within Sweden. Both countries
would first have to arrive at a political situation and
defence policies similar to Sweden's before they could
adopt a programme which linked disarmament and
defence conversion to development.
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